THE INTERCULTURAL DIMENSION OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY by Gutema, Bekele
Title THE INTERCULTURAL DIMENSION OF AFRICANPHILOSOPHY
Author(s)Gutema, Bekele




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
139African Study Monographs, 36 (3): 139–154, September 2015
THE INTERCULTURAL DIMENSION OF AFRICAN PHILOSO-
PHY
Bekele Gutema
Department of philosophy, Addis Ababa University
ABSTRACT  African philosophy assumes that philosophy is a field of knowledge in which 
humans think about their very being and their place in nature, and that it is the province of 
humanity at large rather than of some segment thereof. Questions such as “Does African 
philosophy exist?” and “What is African philosophy?” have elicited protracted debates on the 
nature of philosophy and of rationality in general. This debate has yielded important texts in the 
field of African philosophy. Intercultural philosophy is a new orientation that assumes that 
philosophy originated in different cultures and at different times. It claims that Eurocentric 
assumptions about the origin and nature of philosophy are incorrect. Instead, it argues that there 
are different philosophies and that it is important for proponents of these philosophies to engage 
in dialogues or, ideally, polylogues. The ability to comprehend humanity’s problems in a global 
age requires that representatives of different cultures and philosophies understand one another. 
This can be productive if it is approached from hermeneutic and intercultural perspectives. This 
article highlights intercultural elements in African philosophy that exemplify and derive from 
the indispensability of an intercultural perspective and recommends that a genuine philosophy 
that is able to serve humanity in a global age must be able to function interculturally.
Key Words: African philosophy; Intercultural philosophy; Dialogue/Polylogue; Deconstruc-
tion; Reconstruction.
INTRODUCTION
Philosophy, which has evolved and developed in many cultures, is considered 
to be a form of self-consciousness of a given culture because it examines the 
culture and tries to rationally address fundamental questions. It is what is 
presented as a given that philosophy attempts to explain rationally. Philosophy 
tries to examine what culture takes for granted and in that sense we can call it 
the self-consciousness of a culture. The question of the existence and nature of 
African philosophy has been debated among African philosophers since the 
second half of the 20th century. The debate has not only demonstrated the 
existence of African philosophy but it has also produced a considerable body of 
philosophical texts. 
African philosophy refers to a diverse series of philosophical texts spanning 
centuries. Historians of African philosophy claim that the history of African 
philosophy is constituted by, among other discourses, ancient Egyptian philosophy, 
the philosophies of the centers of Islamic learning in West Africa (e.g., Timbuktu, 
Songhai, etc.), and philosophers such as Anton Wilhelm Amo and Zara Yacob, 
who emerged at the beginning of the modern era. Postcolonial African philosophy 
is constituted by a wide range of philosophical texts in domains such as ethnophi-
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losophy, philosophic sagacity, and social and political philosophy.
This article focuses primarily on postcolonial African philosophy, which has 
evolved from the debates of the 1970s and 1980s. In this context, “African phi-
losophy” is used in the tradition of naming philosophies after their geographic, 
cultural, and ethnic origin (Eze, 1997a). As there is no culturally homogeneous 
Africa, African philosophy is culturally diverse.
Intercultural philosophy is a new orientation in philosophy that attempts to 
broaden the horizon of this field by challenging the Eurocentric assumption that 
there is just one philosophy for the whole of humanity. 
African philosophical texts have shown the need to engage in philosophical 
thinking from an intercultural perspective, and this paper outlines the ideas that 
constitute African and intercultural philosophy showing that many African philos-
ophers have directly or indirectly addressed the notion of interculturality. The paper 
concludes by suggesting that, in a globalizing world, a genuine philosophy must 
strive to achieve a hermeneutic understanding. Understanding and being understood 
are inextricably linked. Those practicing philosophy must realize the importance 
of interculturality because their field strives to understand and be understood. A 
hermeneutic approach strives to understand both sides of issues rather than only 
one.     
WHAT IS AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY? 
African philosophy has been evolving as a discipline that addresses pertinent 
philosophical issues. Indeed, its recognition as an academic field took a long time, 
and some scholars remain uncomfortable with the term “African philosophy”. 
Those who know what happened following the publication of P. Temples’ book, 
“Bantu Philosophy”, in 1945, may already be familiar with this issue. However, 
a brief summary is necessary for those who are unaware of this history. 
Before proceeding with that discussion, I will explain the sense in which 
“African philosophy” is used in this paper. This term is used in accordance with 
a long-established tradition of naming philosophies after their geographic, cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic, and other types of origin. All philosophies are embedded in the 
culture from which they emerge and are considered to constitute a form of self-
consciousness of their culture. Thus, we use terms such as “Indian philosophy”, 
“Chinese philosophy”, or “European philosophy”. The expression “Indian philoso-
phy” is a collective label for philosophies such as Buddhism, Jainism, and so on 
but is not intended to obscure the differences among them. The same thing is true 
for European philosophy; it is a collective name for the range of philosophies 
from rationalism to empiricism and from continental philosophy to analytic phi-
losophy. Although each one of these philosophies has a wide variety of unique 
characteristics, they all try to address issues of ontology, epistemology, moral phi-
losophy, and so on from a rationally critical point of view.
The same is true when we use the expression “African philosophy”, as it does 
not imply the existence of only one philosophy for a continent that contains a 
wide variety of cultures. Hence, it is an expression that represents philosophical 
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thinking on and about the continent of Africa, both ancient and modern. It is 
philosophy because it raises cosmological, ontological, epistemological, and eth-
ical questions and tries to answer these questions philosophically. Thus, the 
expression does not suggest that Africa has only one philosophical system. This 
is not a uniquely African phenomenon. Indeed, just as Chinese philosophy is 
associated with Confucianism, Daoism, and so on, African philosophy is asso-
ciated with ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy, or ancient Egyptian philosophy. 
These philosophies or schools of philosophy are not only different but they are 
also, at times, fundamentally opposed to each other. Hence, “African philoso-
phy” should not be construed as suggesting homogeneity either among African 
cultures or African philosophies.
It was after the writings of P. Temples, J. S. Mbiti, and A. Kagame that the 
issue of the existence and nature of African philosophy became important. 
Individuals who had the opportunity to encounter those involved in the debate 
took the issue seriously.
The major focus of this debate was a kind of daily academic routine that 
took everything at face value. That is, the domain of academia, particularly the 
realm of philosophy, was very quiet. Indeed, the field focused on the same 
questions that had been addressed for two millennia, and the only culture that 
produced philosophy that was considered “entitled” to be considered a bona fide 
academic discipline was Euro–American. Eurocentric thinkers believed that non-
European cultures and peoples, such as the Japanese, Chinese, and Indians, had 
not developed philosophy as such. According to them, writings from these areas 
were characterized as Japanese, Indian, or Chinese “thought”. It was also said 
that these traditions were not really concerned with “pure” philosophical issues 
but, rather, with ethical or religious issues. It was in this context, in which 
philosophy was suffering from complacency and ostensibly characterized by 
“normalcy”, that something “abnormal” occurred and awoke many from their 
“dogmatic slumber”. 
There is now a robust understanding of philosophy that recognizes the exis-
tence of philosophy in many cultures. The Eurocentric thinkers of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries thought that philosophy was a European phenomenon. When 
the idea of an African philosophy was raised after the publication in 1945 of 
P. Temples’ book, it was a shock to those who had been educated and brought 
up on the idea that the only genuine philosophy was European philosophy. There 
is no doubt, however, that India, China, and Japan have long traditions of phil-
osophical reflection.
Many individuals, both African and non-African, were awakened from a 
dogmatic slumber. Indeed, the titles of articles written during this period reflect 
the foregoing in their emphasis on the following: Does African philosophy exist? 
What is African philosophy? Those and similar questions seemed to indicate 
that Africa, African cultures, and Africans themselves lacked the dispositions 
that are presumably essential for philosophy. Some of these writings were based 
on the views of Eurocentric thinkers such as L. L. Bruhl and others who thought 
that African philosophy could not exist, because the African mind lacks the 
attributes that are essential for philosophy. Bruhl coined the idea of the “prim-
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itive mentality” of the “savage”, and Senghor echoed this sentiment by claiming 
“reason is Hellenistic while emotion is black”. There were many Africans who 
were ready to endorse such denigrating assertions. The debate about whether Afri-
can philosophy existed occurred in the context of these assumptions. Thus, for 
some, the very expression itself was offensive, because it appeared that one was 
talking about something that did not exist because philosophy was exclusively 
European.
This debate spanned a long period of time, and it is impossible to 
underestimate the importance of the debate itself and its outcome. It was not 
acceptable to react to the denigrating discourse, which denied rationality to Afri-
cans, with silence. The debate accomplished two purposes. It elicited several 
insightful reactions to the denial of reason to Africans, which, in itself, demon-
strated that debating about the existence and nature of philosophy is also “doing” 
philosophy. It also provided a response to those who complained about wasting 
time debating whether an African philosophy exists instead of actually doing phi-
losophy. The point here was to identify the dividing line between doing philoso-
phy and debating about whether a philosophy exists or about the nature of such 
a philosophy. On the one hand, the debate showed the injustice and irrationality 
of denying that Africans have the capacity to engage in reasoning. On the other 
hand, the materials that the debate produced became philosophical texts that 
addressed important philosophical concepts. As H. O. Oruka wrote, “Much ink 
and energy has been spent in debating this issue. What emerges in the 1990s are 
two basic points that are the direct result of the debate: first, we have not agreed 
on one common definition of the subject and secondly the mere fact of the debate 
has demonstrated the existence of the subject” (Oruka, 1997: 104).
The 1990s have ushered in the end of an era in the history of African philos-
ophy: the era in which questions about whether African philosophy exists could 
seem credible. Indeed, African philosophers try in earnest to tackle important phil-
osophical issues. Reflecting on how and why African philosophers passionately 
engaged in the debate, viz. that it was to gain legitimacy from Western philoso-
phers, P. Amato noted,
… African philosophers need not ask non-African Westerners’ permission to 
be deemed legitimately modern or legitimately philosophical. They need not 
accept that only by conforming to the central methodological tenets of West-
ern philosophy do they earn the right to philosophize. The intellectual cul-
ture of a people expresses its substantive concerns, which cannot legitimately 
be reduced to their form or method of thematization. It is not and has never 
been through the use of a particular method either in the West or anywhere 
else that “philosophy” has earned whatever right it may claim to speak for 
and to humanity. It is rather philosophy’s connection to central human con-
cerns that legitimizes any such claims, and in each case this connection 
takes the form of a set of modalities, methods, or genres of discourse (Amato, 
1997: 73–74).
To be deemed legitimately philosophical, one has to actually do philosophy. 
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One need not have been born or live in a specific region of the world. Reason 
is a universal human trait that has different gestalts depending on where and in 
what contexts it is put to use. It is puzzling that, particularly starting with 
modernity and the Enlightenment, reasoning has been thought to be the attribute 
of only a certain segment of humanity. It is this phenomenon that inspired many 
philosophers to engage in the debate. The debate was not in vain because it 
produced numerous useful philosophical texts. Indeed, the significance of these 
debates should not be underestimated with regard to their contribution to build-
ing the confidence of Africans to both overcome the imperializing of knowledge 
and produce new knowledge. It is this phenomenon that decisively motivated 
African philosophers to create philosophical texts that addressed specific philo-
sophical themes. In this regard, the three books edited by E. C. Eze between 
1996 and 1998 should be noted. These books treat a wide range of issues. For 
example, in “African Philosophy’s Challenge to Continental Philosophy”, R. 
Bernasconi addressed the issue of whether African philosophy is just like any 
other philosophy or whether it is unique. He pondered the implications of answer-
ing the question one way or the other and eventually underscored that African 
philosophy has both deconstructive and reconstructive tasks. Through its decon-
structive tasks African philosophy points out the contradictions within the texts 
of continental philosophy. He noted,
If continental philosophers would open themselves to critique from Afri-
can philosophy and thereby learn more about their own tradition seen from 
“the outside” they would find that the hegemonic concept of reason had 
been displaced, and they would be better placed to learn to respect other 
traditions, including those that are not African (Bernasconi, 1997: 192).
Bernasconi pointed to an important deconstructive task of African philosophy 
in this regard, highlighting a crucial intercultural phenomenon without mention-
ing it by name. By referring to how African philosophy is denied or excluded 
from the philosophy of humankind, he was noting that one of the points that 
deconstruction could discuss is the exclusion itself. The question of whether 
Greek philosophy owes a debt to Egyptian philosophy is important. Why has 
the indebtedness of Greece to Egypt, which was acknowledged by earlier Greek 
sources, been denied since the dawn of the modern age? What is the contribu-
tion of deconstruction to the contemporary dialogue between Western philosophy 
and African philosophy? Although Bernasconi does not refer to them by name, 
these are elements of intercultural encounters. 
Therefore, according to Bernasconi, African philosophy has both deconstruc-
tive and reconstructive tasks. The deconstructive task is concerned with, 
... the unmasking and undoing of the Eurocentric residue inherited from 
colonialism. The unmasking aims at the grounding parameters and cultural 
codes inscribed in these (Eurocentric) political, economic, educational and 
social organizations that still remain oriented by colonial and European 
condescending attitudes. What deserves mentioning in this regard is the 
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task of an African(a) philosophy engaged in exposing the racism of Western 
philosophy (Bernasconi, 1997: 190).
The reconstructive task of African philosophy involves what it can add to con-
tinental philosophy or even to the philosophy of humankind in general. This is 
an appropriately intercultural practice that involves offering, from an African per-
spective, concepts, insights, methods, and other contributions that can enrich those 
who encounter them. 
The books authored by Eze and others in the second half of the 1990s and the 
first decade of the 21st century demonstrate that African philosophers were con-
vinced about the need for philosophy that focused on African cultures and African 
experiences. Indeed, Eze’s book refers to a wide variety of issues discussed above. 
For example, in the debate between K. Wiredu and Eze on the idea of democ-
racy, Wiredu focused on pre-colonial African politics and political decision-making 
processes. Referring to some of Africa’s important political leaders and thinkers, 
such as J. Nyerere, K. Kaunda, and others, Wiredu argued that political decision 
making in Africa is based on consensus, a complex practice that emerged from 
African grass roots, which requires both understanding and compromise. It differs 
significantly from Western democracy, well known for its idea of majority rule. 
Wiredu understood the idea of majority rule as a violation of the human rights 
of those who disagree with the opinion of the majority. In this context, justice is 
not an issue of numbers, and majority rule in which the winner “takes all” is not 
appropriate to the African cultures and experiences of the past. Thus, he suggested 
that one of the reasons that so-called democratization processes could not plant 
deep roots in Africa, despite the numerous attempts to do so, may be because 
they were efforts to “fix” something in a different cultural milieu. Without 
suggesting how consensual democracy could work in today’s societies, he 
recommended that we seriously consider the application of consensual decision 
making in Africa.
Wiredu recommended a consensual “non-party polity” rather than the earlier 
one-party system or the Western multiparty system. The success of this 
recommendation will depend on how such a system will be structured and the 
manner in which it will be implemented. From the perspective of this paper, the 
main point of this discussion is that African philosophy tries to grapple with real 
issues. 
Eze advanced an opposite opinion on this issue, challenging Wiredu’s arguments 
as follows:
Democracy is one of the several sorts of social framework that a people 
adopt in order to mediate the struggles and the conflicts that necessarily 
arise from the necessarily competitive nature of individuated identities and 
desires. A democracy’s raison d’ etre is the legitimation—and “management” 
of this always already competitive (i.e., inherently political) condition of 
relativized desires. In this sense, “consensus” or “unanimity” of substantive 
decisions cannot be the ultimate goal of democracy, but only one of its 
moments. Democracy as a political institution is a social compact that says, 
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“we will agree, or agree to disagree,” and these are the established mech-
anisms or rules according to which we shall secure and maintain as long 
as necessary each of these possibilities (Eze, 1997b: 320–321).
Two points should be noted in this context. The first is how African philos-
ophers engage with the idea of democracy from their own perspectives, enrich-
ing it by invoking related African ideas and practices. We may agree or disagree 
with one or another of the ideas, but these texts provide a response to those 
who say that African philosophy and philosophers do not do philosophy but 
only lament the lack of philosophy or their victimization by colonialism. Sec-
ond, the texts cited above constitute contributions by African cultures and expe-
riences to the idea of philosophy in general and, in this case, to the idea of 
democracy. They are also examples of intercultural philosophizing, despite the 
fact that neither Wiredu nor Eze labeled them as such. However, in my opin-
ion, these texts show the unavoidability of interculturality given that relation-
ships among cultures always involve mutual influence. 
Eze’s three books and P. H. Coetze and A. P. J. Roux’s works are among the 
major texts in the domain of African philosophy produced in the 1990s. It is 
already evident in these works that philosophers have decisively moved away 
from issues related to the definition of African philosophy and the question of 
its very existence. Indeed, they reflect a systematic study of concepts catego-
rized into metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, and other branches of 
philosophy. African philosophers have gone beyond the earlier seemingly 
intractable issues and have tried to contribute to philosophy from an African 
perspective. 
The 21st century has probably helped to promote these events in important 
ways. Evidence for this position can be found in the conferences and the themes 
of the conferences on African philosophy as well as in the journal articles and 
books that have been published since the turn of the century. Associations such 
as the International Society for African Philosophy and Studies (ISAPS) and 
others have played important roles in this progression.
ISAPS conferences have become an important feature of the philosophical 
landscape of Africa. ISAPS papers are evidence that the authors are trying to 
cultivate an African tradition of philosophy. They demonstrate that African 
philosophers have the advantage of working from cultural and educational back-
grounds that could be characterized as intercultural. Whether they have studied 
in Africa or overseas, African philosophers have a background in Western edu-
cation due to the Western curricula that have structured their education. On the 
other hand, the cultural background into which they were born and in which 
they were brought up is also important to consider. Some of these thinkers used 
methods that they appropriated while studying European philosophy to interpret 
African epistemological, moral, and other issues. I believe that this can be seen 
as an act of intercultural philosophical practice in which one can work com-
paratively and identify concepts that may be common to different traditions. It 
also provides a good example of how methods or concepts that have been devel-
oped in a different tradition (European) can be useful in another (African) 
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tradition. This may be seen as a form of intercultural practice that aims not only 
at criticizing but also at learning and appropriating from a tradition that is outside 
one’s own.
Of the works published during the first decade of the 21st century, those of T. 
Kiros, P. Hountondji, M. Kebede, M. B. Ramose, and Eze are particularly worth 
mentioning.
Teodros Kiros’ edited book (2001), “Explorations in African Political Philoso-
phy”, brings together the works of important thinkers in African philosophy, such 
as Wiredu, D. A. Masolo, K. A. Appiah, A. Mazrui, C. Sumner, and others, who 
have tried to reflect on important issues in this domain. The topics discussed 
include democracy, sagacity, ethnic identity, politics, and so on. It represents the 
practice of African philosophizing as it relates to issues that were of primary con-
cern to Africa at the turn of the century. 
Kiros’ introductory chapter sets the tone of the book. The title of the Introduc-
tion is “African Philosophy: A Critical/Moral Practice”, and Kiros addressed the 
themes that warrant philosophical reflection. He stated that, despite our recogni-
tion of the topics that are considered to deserve serious philosophical discussion 
according to “mainstream” philosophy, we should not hide ourselves behind the 
abstract quest for knowledge. He also pointed out that it is unnecessary “to seek 
a totalizing narrative that captures the essential nature of African philosophy … 
African philosophers should not shy away from taking positions on urgent moral 
and political matters”. The range of issues that philosophers should treat critically 
include: “ethnic cleansing, superfluous and expensive wars, HIV/AIDS, hunger, 
poverty, inequalities of wealth, and asymmetrical relationships of power. These 
must be topics that serious philosophy tackles” (Kiros, 2001: 1).  
He also developed what he called principles that should guide African philoso-
phy as a critical/moral practice: “The first principle is the recognition of food, 
health, shelter and clothing as inalienable human rights … The second principle 
is a demand for the absolutely necessary duty humans may have in the recogni-
tion of the importance of freedom for those who think and feel that they are 
unfree” (Kiros, 2001: 3)  
Given the particular situation of Africa, he argued that philosophy must be a 
critical/moral practice. Although he did not disregard the other branches of phi-
losophy, he suggested that the topics that require the application of philosophical 
thought as a critical/moral practice primarily involve epistemological, moral, and 
socio–political issues. He referred to what he called the tragedies of history, the 
situations that Africa has faced over the years, including the slave trade, colonial-
ism, and the internal problems of dictatorships, the failure to meet the aspirations 
of independence, and many other internal problems.
On the other hand, in his book “Africa’s Quest for a Philosophy of Decoloni-
zation”, Messay Kebede (2004) tackled a number of issues, particularly those 
involving the status of Africa in the eyes of European thinkers and how Africa 
should draw on its own resources to complete the process of decolonization. Among 
the points that Kebede discussed at the beginning of his book is “The Invention 
of the White Man”. This topic is reminiscent of Mudimbe’s book, “The Invention 
of Africa”, which tried to show that the idea of Africa is not the true idea of 
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Africa but the Africa that the Europeans want and that they invented through their 
own discourse. Kebede seemed to be completing what Mudimbe started when he 
noted that the white man fabricates ideas about Africa and the Africans. However, 
that was not the only point: the white man also fabricates ideas (false) about him-
self as well. In fact, according to Kebede, the white man must believe many false 
things about himself before he starts to believe false things about others. This 
underscores that a substantial portion of the Eurocentric discourse about Africa 
associated with the likes of Bruhl is unfounded. Indeed, these unfounded ideas 
about Africa and the Africans were based on other unfounded ideas that Bruhl 
and his ilk had about themselves.
He further noted that the characterization of the white man as rational and the 
non-white (African) as irrational is wrong. Kebede also noted irrationality among 
thinkers who are taken to be at the forefront of rationality. In Western philosophy, 
Plato is a giant who is credited with the development of important concepts that 
have inspired long and enduring discussions. However, people often forget the 
mystical and irrational elements in his system and overemphasize the rational; yet, 
both are to be found in his system. His examples include Plato’s idea of the intel-
ligible world and Freud’s interpretation of dreams, and his point is that the West 
created an inaccurate dichotomy between rationality and irrationality, science and 
mysticism, modernity and tradition, and so on. Furthermore, it is, in fact, difficult 
to draw hard and fast lines between these positions. Hence, progress should not 
involve condemning the past or criticizing ethnophilosophy but, rather, it should 
involve embracing and harnessing it to rationality. 
The late Eze’s “On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and 
Racism”, is another important text produced in the first decade of this century. As 
reflected in its title, the main focus of the book is reason. The author understood 
reason as a human disposition situated in experience (i.e., in particular cultural 
contexts). This point is especially crucial given that reason has been construed as 
the main dividing line between Europeans and non-Europeans. Indeed, the debate 
on rationality is one of the fundamental issues that African philosophy has been 
trying to address. Thus, Eze began with the point that reason is not a thing. It is 
a human disposition. It is not something overarching. It is situated in specific cul-
tural experiences. Hence, it would be unrealistic to think of reason outside of the 
realities of cultural diversity. Eze answered the question of whether rationality has 
any meaning beyond the realities of cultural differences as follows:
… above all, it is my hope that, taken together, the various practical intu-
itions, interpretations and explanations, and justifications will constitute 
different examples of reasoning-in-action. These exemplars of rationality-in-
act reveal the grounds of reason’s abstract principles as well as the relations 
of these principles to the practical interests of individuals, institutions, and 
cultures. I thereby hope to discover how to test not just the claims of indi-
viduals to rationality but also the rationality of cultural practices and other 
kinds of events that claim to be productive of reason. My methodology, in 
deed provides proof of the truth of the statement: rationality, like a work of 
art is best appreciated from multiple points of view (Eze, 2008: xiii).
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His discussion of the varieties of rational experience is a detailed and insight-
ful treatment of the forms that rationality can adopt at different times and places, 
thereby showing the situatedness of reason. He said, 
First, there is neither in the purest conceptions of human rationality nor in 
the language of any cultures evidence that reason or language escapes time 
and sociality. This inescapability of historical fate by any rationality is …
entirely due to the character of experience. And it is only in experience that 
we can come to know what it is rationality must look like if it is to be 
considered an essential attribute of humanity (Eze, 2008: 125–126).
His profound discussion and understanding of rationality demonstrates that 
rationality is at work when humans try to make sense of a given situation. Ratio-
nality cannot escape time and space. In other words, rationality has no meaning 
beyond the culture in which it is embedded. Rationality takes its specific form 
(calculative, empirical, phenomenological, etc.) in a specific cultural context. We 
know from intercultural philosophy that the cultural context is not a pure context 
because there is no pure culture.  
The number of books being produced in the area of African philosophy is 
increasing. In addition to those mentioned earlier, other books have been written 
on African philosophy during the first decade of this century. It is not possible 
for me to list them all or to highlight the ideas contained in these books in this 
paper. However, mention must be made of Wiredu’s “A Companion to African 
Philosophy”, Ramose’s “African Philosophy through Ubuntu”, and R. Bell’s “Under-
standing African Philosophy: A Cross-Cultural Approach to Classical and Contem-
porary Issues”. 
Wiredu’s book brings together numerous essays grouped according to the branch 
of philosophy to which it belongs. It shows the length to which African 
philosophers have gone to articulate the problematics of an African philosophy. 
Its importance for teaching and research should not be underestimated.
After pondering the issue of rationality that has been central to the debate on 
African philosophy and discussing the role of African philosophy in Africa’s 
genuine liberation, Ramose’s “African Philosophy through Ubuntu” explored how 
ubuntu relates to African philosophy in general and to the ideas of religion, law, 
politics, and so on. Ubuntu, which means humanity and concerns how the 
individual relates to the community, constitutes the basis of the belief systems of 
various African cultures; it was summarized by Mbiti as follows: “I am because 
we are”. According to ubuntu, we should treat each other from a position of uni-
versal humanity. Hence, Ramose underscores the point that the basis of African 
philosophy must be the idea of ubuntu.
As its title suggests, Bell’s book is particularly important for the project of 
intercultural philosophy. It address how one (a non-African) should put oneself in 
the place of the other (an African) to understand the other. That is, due to the 
particular history of Africa, African philosophy must embrace an intercultural 
Gestalt. He wrote,
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… Africans and their philosophical reflections have been brought into 
dialogue with others who have longer histories of philosophy. This cross-
cultural dialogue is itself central to understanding African philosophy. The 
cross-cultural nature of understanding its philosophy is of particular impor-
tance because of the radical—one might say even traumatic—interface that 
Africa has had with European culture and with Western modernity (Bell, 
2002: x).   
Although each tackles philosophical issues from the perspective of Africa, it is 
clear that, knowingly or unknowingly, they could not avoid interculturality or 
cross-culturality, as Bell said. 
I acknowledge that my discussion has been very schematic. In concluding this 
portion of the paper, I refer to A. Graness’ book, which appeared in 2011 
(Graness, 2011). By discussing one of the important and new trends in African 
philosophy, viz. O. Oruka’s sage philosophy, she explored a number of important 
ideas. Her work reflects the fecundity of the field and how discussions of impor-
tant concepts such global justice shed new light on issues. More importantly, she 
showed the importance of interculturality, addressing how philosophies from dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds could address problems such as global justice, poverty, 
and so on. She focused especially on the idea of the “human minimum”, an idea 
used by Oruka long before others started talking about global justice. Can we talk 
of a morally responsible person without the fulfillment of the “human minimum”? 
Can a philosophy rooted in just one specific culture address the issue of global 
justice? Graness’ position is that, in a globalizing world, solving problems that 
are crucial to humanity requires the philosophical resources of the whole of human-
ity (i.e., interculturality).
It would be unfair to end this part of my paper without mentioning African 
women and non-African women philosophers engaged in African philosophy. The 
imbalance with regard to gender that we see in other fields of study is present in 
philosophy as well, as there are fewer female than male philosophers. However, 
this should not be construed to mean that no women philosophers engage in 
African philosophy. Indeed, observations of publications and conference partici-
pants make it clear a number of African and non-African female philosophers deal 
with the different themes of African philosophy. For example, the 6th Annual 
Conference of ISAPS in Nairobi in 2000 included Helen Oduk and Pamela Abuya, 
both Kenyans, and a number of philosophers, such as Gail Presbey, Irene Danysh, 
and others, as participants. Many female philosophers attended the 7th Annual 
Conference in Addis Ababa the next year.
In this connection, it is essential to introduce the Nigerian philosopher Sophie 
B. Oluwole, who has authored a number of publications. One of her books, 
“Philosophy and Oral Tradition” (Oluwole, 1999), deals with a number of central 
issues, including those related to writing and method. Questions of method are 
important issues in African and in any philosophy, and Oluwole devoted serious 
thought to these issues. On the other hand, in contrast to the views of Hountondji 
and a few others, Oluwole argued that the question of writing, though important, 
is not the decisive issue. Writing is important for any philosophy in that it makes 
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that text available for easy reference, analysis, and critique. However, there are 
also other ways, such as orality, in which reason can express itself. 
In the same text, she addressed another important issue, accommodativeness 
versus an adversarial approach to philosophical issues, which has been considered 
by certain philosophers to be vital to the doing of philosophy. Oluwole disagreed 
with this point, arguing that an accommodative approach does not entail the absence 
of a clear philosophical position. Instead, it may be the sign of a healthy 
skepticism that allows one to listen to a different position. She has noted that, 
“Accommodativeness entails the intellectual modesty of not being necessarily con-
descending or unnecessarily aggressive in dialogue”. Such an approach avoids a 
fanatical or fundamentalist commitment to one’s position or method. Indeed, the 
history of Western philosophy demonstrates that specific ideas that have been taken 
as absolutely true by a certain philosopher(s) are used to undermine other ideas. 
Oluwole’s position favors an intercultural approach. Ideas that claim absolute cer-
tainty for themselves can easily lead to a monologue. In this particular case, she 
does not use the concept of interculturality, but accommodativeness basically refers 
to an epistemological modesty that is inconsistent with unilateral declarations of 
positions as absolutely correct. She frequently referred to rules (the equality of 
the partners in a dialogue, the openness of the outcome of a dialogue, etc.) that 
need to be considered when engaging in dia-polylogical encounters. With this 
background, we can proceed to a discussion of intercultural philosophy.
INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY  
Intercultural philosophy is not a new system or branch of philosophy. Instead, 
it is a new philosophical orientation and attitude that assumes that no philosophy 
is the philosophy for humankind.
Hence, intercultural philosophy was founded by philosophers such as F. M. 
Wimmer, R. A. Mall, H. Kimmerle, and others with the conviction that philoso-
phy and the history of philosophy have been Eurocentric, which has had at least 
two important results or implications. First, the assumption that philosophy is 
European/Greek relegates philosophies embedded in other cultures to a second-
class status. European philosophy’s exclusive claim to rationality and hence to 
philosophy has no rational or empirical justification. Second, the practical impli-
cations of such an understanding and the behavior it involves are not helpful to 
humankind because Europe’s exclusive claim to rationality and philosophy denies 
the philosophies embedded in other cultures. In other words, it denies the experi-
ences of a huge segment of humanity. Yet, we can learn an enormous amount 
from the philosophies, experiences, and knowledge of other parts of the world. In 
fact, the latter point renders interculturality necessary. The denial of the 
rationality of others cannot occur without the infliction of injury on oneself because 
denying the rationality of the other is tantamount to denying both one’s own con-
tribution to others and that one has been influenced, or even enriched, by others.
The goal of intercultural philosophy in this regard is to attempt to broaden the 
horizons of philosophy. It is an effort to go beyond the limitations placed on 
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philosophy for unphilosophical reasons. In actual fact, European philosophy is a 
product of a culture and experiences enriched by mutual and multilateral relation-
ships; hence, philosophers’ claim that only European culture could produce such 
thoughts is not justifiable. This perspective constitutes a denial of the real 
conditions under which ideas (philosophical or otherwise) come into being, and it 
limits the horizons of philosophy in ways that have both theoretical and practical 
implications. Intercultural philosophy’s attempt to broaden the horizons of 
philosophy is an attempt to overcome this problem. 
As a founder of intercultural philosophy, Wimmer was inspired by, among other 
factors, the fact that a globalizing world requires mutual understanding and, if 
possible, reciprocal enlightenment and enrichment among the different cultures that 
comprise humanity. The real situation involving cultures and philosophies demands 
an intercultural approach if philosophy is to be meaningful to humankind. Although 
the Eurocentric tradition tries to deny or gloss over the relationships among cul-
tures and philosophies, we encounter scholars, including those from different dis-
ciplines, whose research reveals the relationships between cultures as a matter of 
course. The work of S. Harding is not directly related to intercultural philosophy. 
However, one of her essays, “Is Modern Science an Ethno Science? Rethinking 
Epistemological Assumptions”, underscored the fact that cultures have been inter-
acting since the beginning of recorded history:
Two facts of the flowering of postcolonial, single-stream history conflict with 
the history of science most of us learned. These accounts tell the history of 
Europeans as part of the history of peoples of the Americas, Africa, Asia, 
and the rest of the world and vice versa. Moreover, these accounts do not 
restrict their perspective to the way such histories tend to appear from the 
dominant European discourses. They start off their accounts from the lives 
of peoples whom Europeans encountered, and from their histories prior to 
the arrival of the Europeans on their shores. In doing so, they are able to 
provide more balanced, less Eurocentric accounts of encounters and inter-
minglings of peoples throughout human history. From the beginnings of 
recorded history, they report, cultures have been interacting with each other 
... (Harding, 1997: 53). 
Such insights from scholars who did not intend to directly address intercultural 
philosophical issues but were concerned with matters indirectly related to the issue 
of interculturality shed important light on this domain. Indeed, if cultures have 
been interacting from the beginning of recorded history, then the issue of mutual 
influence and enlightenment among cultures, or what is termed as the “give and 
take ethos” among cultures, must be taken seriously. If one wants to understand 
the real nature of cultures, and of the philosophies embedded in these cultures, 
dealing with such interaction is indispensable. It is in this way that we can get 
the fuller picture of a culture and its philosophy.
D. Ingram’s book, “Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference”, is con-
cerned with the politico–philosophical issues of group rights. It also offers an 
insight that is helpful for intercultural philosophy: “It is virtually impossible (if 
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not desirable) for any culture to so completely differentiate itself from other cul-
tures that communication and contamination are precluded. Cultures survive and 
adapt by absorbing (learning from) other cultures” (Ingram, 2000: 254).  
The arguments that Wimmer and others involved in intercultural philosophy 
have advanced hold that, in the absence of pure cultures, it is not only important 
but also necessary to do philosophy interculturally. This point is echoed in other 
disciplines as well because interculturality is a real element in the cultural inter-
actions and human values that determine our lives. It is important to note that 
those who want to advance one or the other form of centrism do it at the peril 
of making their philosophy one-sided. The reason why it might seem desirable to 
advance an ethnocentric position is both unclear and unrealistic because one can 
advance an exclusive ethnocentric argument merely by denying the knowledge, 
norms and values appropriated from other centers. All centers/centrisms have 
learned something from other centers.  Fear, pleasure, sorrow, the need for sur-
vival, and the like are some of the drives that largely determine how we act. 
Humanity evolves and develops the values by means of which it deals with these 
drives. This process obviously involves humans learning from one another. It is 
the recognition of this fact that demands that philosophical issues be approached 
interculturally. As Wimmer said, “Wherever possible, look for transcultural 
overlapping of philosophical concepts and theories, since it is probable that well-
founded theories have developed in more than one cultural tradition” (Wimmer, 
2002: 33).
I will now turn to the issue of how and to what extent African philosophy is 
trying to be intercultural. In terms of its origin, intercultural philosophy is defi-
nitely limited to Austria and Germany. However, one should not neglect the work 
of philosophers from other parts of the world, particularly India, or the “Chennai 
Journal of Intercultural philosophy”.
Nonetheless, intercultural philosophy was founded in German-speaking countries, 
and numerous materials on the subject have been written in German, which has 
limited the number of people with access to ideas in this field. Although some 
individuals may have encountered these ideas by chance, others have not had the 
opportunity to learn of even the very existence of this discipline. In my opinion, 
this may be one of the reasons why intercultural philosophy has not flourished in 
African universities.
Previous and current conferences include very few topics that directly deal with 
intercultural philosophy. However, the late Claude Sumner and I have made some 
efforts in this regard. The 2001 Annual Conference of ISAPS included papers that 
dealt with interculturality: Professor Sumner’s paper (2005) was titled, “Inter- 
African Cultural Impact: Egypt Ethiopia” and mine (Gutema, 2005) was titled, 
“The Need for an Intercultural Approach in African Philosophy”. Both papers were 
published in the Proceedings of the Conference. As a member of the Department 
of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University, I have introduced two courses on inter-
cultural philosophy, one at the undergraduate and another at the graduate level. 
Some of my graduate students have understood the importance of this area, and 
a few have completed M. A. theses related to intercultural philosophy. For exam-
ple, interculturality and the ideas of liberation philosophy and transmodernity play 
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central roles in Wegene Mengistu’s M. A. thesis, “Cultural Hybridization or 
Cultural Homogenization: The Resistance of the Other”, which was completed in 
2011. These instances are indicators that interculturality in philosophy in general, 
and in African philosophy in particular, is somehow taking root, however slowly.
CONCLUSION
In my opinion, African philosophy during the past two decades clearly bears 
the stamp of interculturality. This is because we cannot avoid interculturality, given 
that it is the reality of our lives. It is ironic that the very element that is 
pervasive in many of our writings, because of the reality of the intercultural nature 
of cultures and philosophies, is not openly recognized by many. Indeed, many 
practice it without openly declaring that they are doing so. This said, many 
philosophers in both Anglophone and Francophone countries have very limited 
access to materials produced in the German language. Additionally, one needs to 
understand German to read some of the important writings on intercultural 
philosophy, whether by Wimmer, Mall, or others. Polylog, the Journal of Intercul-
tural Philosophizing, which is published by the Viennese Society for Intercultural 
Philosophy, is a good example of this situation. It is the most important avenue 
through which the ideas of intercultural philosophy are being advanced, but one 
needs to understand German to read it. 
Despite its importance and reception in certain areas, intercultural philosophy 
faces barriers such as language and the intransigence of longstanding relationships. 
Indeed, Anglophone countries engage in intensive communication with Britain or 
the US because of a common language and history, and the Francophone coun-
tries have strong relationships with France for the same reasons. However, inter-
cultural philosophy is proliferating in areas in which German is spoken, a situa-
tion that simultaneously renders language among the barriers that must be over-
come, and underscores the need for intercultural philosophy. As Wimmer wrote,
There are good reasons to hold that philosophy today and in the future will 
have serious shortcomings if it continues to discuss global questions only 
within the framework of concepts and methods derived from occidental lore. 
If philosophy will not surpass  its “Occidentalism” by going forward to a 
true globalization, it will fail to give answers to humankind in the future. 
So there are reasons to accept the view that philosophy in a general sense 
has several—and perhaps many—origins (Wimmer, 2002: 8).
Although intercultural philosophy is taking root, an intercultural approach to 
African philosophy has not yet progressed as far as it should have. The contem-
porary importance of intercultural philosophy renders the use of an intercultural 
approach both necessary and fruitful. It is incumbent on philosophers to create an 
atmosphere in which both teaching and research related to intercultural philosophy 
can flourish.      
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